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Incentives to save for retirement have been an important component of
government tax policy since the Revenue Act of 1942 made employer
pension contributions tax-deductible. Since that time, pension funds
have grown enormously. Private firm pension assets increased from $13
billion in 1950 to $1,836 billion in 1989.1 But only about half of the work
force is covered by a pension plan and thus benefit from this inducement
to employers to save for their employees' retirement. To address this
inequity and to provide a retirement saving incentive for employees not
covered by pension plans, the Individual Retirement Account (IRA) was
introduced in 1974. Under this plan, employees without an employer-
provided pension plan could put up to $1,500 each year in an IRA
account. The contribution was tax-deductible and the return on the bal-
ance accumulated tax free. Taxes were paid on withdrawal. The non-
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1Including government pension funds the total was $2,786 billion in 1989.2Venti and Wise
employed spouse of an employee could contribute up to $250 per year.
The self-employed were covered by Keogh plans introduced in 1962. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 extended the IRA to all employees
beginning in 1982. In addition, the contribution limit, which was in-
creased to $1,750 in 1977, was raised to $2,000.
The 1981 legislation sparked a wave of promotion by IRAs by banks
and other financial institutions. IRA (and Keogh) assets grew from $39
billion in 1981 to almost one-half trillion by 1989 (see Piacentini and
Cerino, 1990). By 1989, IRA assets were equal to 27 percent of firm
pension plan assets, an increase from only 4 percent fri 1981. About 30
percent of households had IRA accounts by 1986. After firm pension
plans, IRAs seemed destined to become the principal form of saving for
retirement. IRAs are the focus of this paper. More recently there has
been an explosion in 401(k) plans that do not have income restrictions
and have higher contribution limits.
Largely because of their tax cost, IRAs were a major topic of discus-
sion prior to passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The original "Trea-
sury I" plan proposed that the annual contribution limit be raised to
$2,500 and that the spousal contribution be raised from the $250 to
$2,500. The Senate Finance Committee proposed that the existing plan
be eliminated. The compromise solution left the existing plan intact for
families with incomes less than $40,000, for single persons with in-
comes less than $25,000, and for all persons not covered by a firm
pension plan. For those with a pension plan, the tax deduction of the
contribution was phased out between $40,000 and $50,000 for families
and between $25,000 and $35,000 for single persons. Even persons with
incomes above these limits could contribute to an IRA without the tax
deduction and the returns accumulated tax free, with the tax to be paid
on withdrawal.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the tax deduction for about 15
percent of the 1985 contributors and partially restricted the deduction for
another 12 percent (see Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1986). But
the number of contributors and the amount contributed fell much more
than these figures would suggest. The total amount deducted dropped
from $37.8 billion to $14.1 billion, a 62.8 percent decline.2 This "overreac-
tion" is at least in part attributable to widespread misunderstanding of
the legislation (often reported at the time to have eliminated IRA5) and
to the marked decline in the promotion of IRAs. Indeed, a recent survey
revealed that about half of all persons eligible for an IRA deduction
2 The percent of tax returns showing an IRA deduction fell from 15.1 percent in 1986 to 6.8
percent in 1987, a 55.0 percent decline.Policy and Retirement Saving3
following the 1986 legislation mistakenly believed they were no longer
eligible. (IRA Reporter, 1988).
The debate surrounding the 1986 legislation raised questions about the
distribution of accounts by income and about the net saving effect of the
accounts.3 The latter question has led to the most extensive empirical
research. An early paper by Hubbard (1984) using a 1979 survey con-
ducted for the President's Commission on Pension Policy suggested that
IRAs stimulated new saving prior to 1982. He found that contributions to
IRAs and Keoghs, unlike "saving" through private pensions or Social
Security, increase household net worth, given permanent income and
other household characteristics. In a series of papers based on the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances, the Survey of Income and Participation,
and the Consumer Expenditure Surveys, Venti and Wise (1986, 1987,
1990a, 1991a) concluded that additional IRA contributions represented
"new" saving for the most part. Feenberg and Skinner (1989), using a
1980 to 1984 panel of taxpayers, found that IRA contributors increased
their saving over time by more than noncontributors even after control-
ling for initial wealth. They were unable to find substitution of IRA for
non-IRA saving. Gale and Scholz (1990), based on the 1986 Survey of
Consumer Finances, concludes that most IRA saving is not new saving,
but rather represents saving that otherwise would have occurred in
other forms. Joines and Manegold (1991), using a taxpayer panel, offer a
middle-ground estimate. All of the studies agree that about $0.30 to
$0.35 of each dollar put in an IRA account is funded by reducing taxes.
The various Venti and Wise estimates suggest that $0.45 to $0.66 of each
dollar comes from reducing consumption expenditure, the Feenberg and
Skinner estimates imply that about two-thirds of each dollar comes from
reduced consumption, the Gale and Scholz estimates are from $.02 to
$0.25, and the Joines and Manegold "best guess" is $0.305.
The goal of this paper is not to review these studies, although such an
endeavor would certainly be worthwhile. Instead, we present in a sim-
ple format the basic patterns of IRA and non-IRA saving behavior, with-
out the constraints imposed by the more formal models, some of which
are rather complex.
The paper begins with a review of the level of personal saving in the
United States and a discussion of the distribution of IRA accounts by age
The proponents of the original 1974 IRA legislation emphasized the savings inducement
for persons not covered by private pension plans. But whether this goal has been met has
received little recent attention. We found in earlier work (Venti and Wise, 1988) that it was
not. After controlling for individual attributes such as age and income, we found that
persons without pension plans are no more likely than persons with pensions to contribute
to an IRA account.4Venti and Wise
and income. The data suggest that at least 40 percent of households
would have opened an IRA account over the course of their lives under
the pre-1986 legislation. At least 60 percent of households with incomes
above $30,000 would have opened accounts. Evidence on the saving
effects of IRAs is presented in sections II through IV. The exposition is
primarily graphical. Although the analysis is nontechnical, by consider-
ing several types of data we attempt to account for factors, such as
individual propensity to save, that may confound the interpretation of
the data. We find that the data provide little support for the possibility
that IRAs had no net saving effect. Finally, we comment on the simple
theoretical model that has led some observers to conclude that IRAs had
no saving effect. We conclude that this simple model does not capture
the prominent features of IRA saving and thus that its implications are
unlikely to be valid. In particular, the assumption that IRA saving and
other saving are treated by actual decision makers as perfect substitutes
is inconsistent with the empirical evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
Most of the data discussed here pertain to IRA contributions, IRA asset
balances, and non-IRA asset balances. The data are from three sources:
the Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CESs) for 1980 through 1989, the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for 1985 through
1987, and the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) for 1983 and 1986.
Although much of the data in the three surveys is overlapping, the exact
coverage and definitions differ among the surveys. The CES data span
the period before and after the IRA program. They provide data on non-
IRA asset balances and on IRA contributions in each year, but not on
IRA balances. Both the SIPP and the SCF provide detailed information
on non-IRA asset balances and IRA balances, but not on IRA contribu-
tions. The household is the unit of analysis for the CES and the SCF data;
the SIPP data allow analysis based on household and family units. The
family is the more appropriate unit because it corresponds to the typical
IRS tax filing unit. For comparability, however, we present household
data in most instances. For all the analyses in this paper a household or
family is excluded if either the respondent or the spouse of the respon-
dent is self-employed. The self-employed had access to Keogh plans
with very different contribution limits than IRAs. In most cases IRAs
were not a feasible option for the self-employed. Elimination of the self-
employed also minimizes a potential complication that arises because
two of the surveys (the CESs and the 1986 SCF) ask respondents forPolicy and Retirement Saving5
combined IRA and Keogh balances. Some details of each of the data sets
are presented in the Appendix.
A. Low Personal Saving in the United States
On the eve of retirement the typical American family has only about
$6,600 in financial assets. Personal saving in the United States has de-
clined substantially as a fraction of personal income since the early 1950s
and a large proportion of families reach retirement age with little or no
personal saving. Personal saving declined from between 3% and 6% of
disposable private income in the 1950s to around 1 percent in the early
1980s, based on computations made by Summers and Carroll (1987).4
These numbers are adjusted for inflation and exclude saving by employ-
ers through defined-benefit pension plans.5 Without the inflation adjust-
ment, the downward trend begins only after 1973.
Aggregate saving rates, of course, reflect the wealth accumulation of
all households, some of whom save very large amounts. Micro data
show that a large fraction of families have almost no personal saving.
Based on the recent Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
we (Venti and Wise 1991a) computed the composition of total wealth for
all households in 1984. The results are summarized in Figure 1. The
amounts reflect median wealth by asset category.6 It is clear that most
families approach retirement age with very little personal saving other
than housing equity. Among households with heads aged 60 to 65,
median liquid wealth is only $6,600; the median value of housing equity
is $43,000. The majority of families rely heavily on Social Security bene-
fits for support after retirement, and to a much more limited extent on
the saving that is done for them by employers through defined-benefit
pension plans.8
Many other studies using different definitions of saving have reported a similar down-
ward trend. See for example, Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991).
The National Income Accounts include firm contributions to defined-benefit pension
plans under "personal saving." Inflation-adjusted saving is measured saving, minus the
inflation rate (the GNP deflator), times net interest-beating assets.
6 Thus the component medians do not sum to the median of total wealth.
Liquid wealth is broadly defined to include interest earning assets held in banks and
other institutions, mortgages held, money owed from sale of businesses, U.S. Savings
Bonds, and checking accounts, equity in stocks and mutual fund shares, less unsecured
debt. Other wealth includes net equity in vehicles, business equity, and real estate equity
(other than owned home).
8 The SIPP data allow estimation of the value of Social Security and pension plan benefits
only after the payments are received. Thus wealth in the form of Social Security and
pensions is only recorded for persons who have begun to receive the payments. The

















FIGURE 1. Median asset balance by age and type of asset.
B. IRA Assets and The Distribution
of Accounts by Age and Income
The explosion of IRA saving after the 1981 legislation can be judged by
comparing assets in IRA accounts to firm pension fund assets, reflecting
the retirement saving by firms for their employees. The aggregate data
are graphed in Figure 2. Assets in IRA (and Keogh) accounts were only
about 4 percent as large as pension fund assets in 1981. By 1989, accumu-
lation of personal saving in IRA accounts amounted to $493.7 billion and
was almost 27 percent as large as pension fund assets. Without the
precipitous decline in IRA contributions after the 1986 bill, IRA assets
apparently would have continued to grow.
At the individual level, the importance of IRAs for contributing house-
Security wealth is $83,700 and the median of pension wealth $11,200); the median of
housing wealth is $38,000 and the median of liquid financial assets is only $10,000, for
households with heads age 65 to 70.
The data are reported in Piacentini and Cerino (1990) and include IRA and Keogh assets



















































































































































































































holds grew rapidly as well. The median ratio of IRA to other financial
assets (excluding stocks and bonds) increased from essentially zero in
1980 to 0.75 in 1986, for households with accounts in 1986. If stocks and
bonds are included, the ratio was 0.46. Most households without IRA
saving in 1986 were essentially nonsavers, like the majority of American
households. The median level of their financial assets was about $1,500
in 1986. As the following discussion will show, a large fraction of IRA
savers also saved very little before the advent of the IRA program.
The realization that a large fraction of Americans do not save at all is
important in assessing the impact of the IRA program. The data pre-
sented below suggest to us that IRA savers increased their total saving
substantially after 1982. Many were saving very little before they began
to contribute to an IRA. But many households did not save before and
still do not. A significant proportion of these nonsavers will have low
lifetime incomes and Social Security retirement benefits will replace a
large fraction of their annual preretirement earnings. They may expect to
maintain their preretirement standard of living with no personal saving
and may never save through an IRA account.
But a large fraction of households with modest lifetime incomes would
have been IRA savers under the pre-1986 legislation. The percent of
households with IRA accounts in 1986 ranged from close to zero for
young households with very low incomes to over 70 percent among
older households with high incomes, as shown in Figure 3.10 Like other
saving, IRA saving increases with age and income. Over 50 percent of
households with annual income above $20,000 would have opened an
IRA account before they retired, based on the 1986 participation rate of
households with heads 55 to 65 and income over $20,000. About 60
percent in this age bracket with incomes over $30,000 had accounts and
65 percent of those with incomes over $40,000.11 Thus, relative to other
saving, IRA saving is very widespread.
IRAs sometimes are portrayed as held by only a few and concentrated
among the wealthy. About 60 percent of 1986 IRA accounts and 50
percent of IRA assets were held by households with incomes of less than
$50,000.12 Only 34 percent of non-IRA financial assets are held by house-
10 Figure 3 is based on SIPP data. Over 80 percent of older high-income households
contributed, according to SCF data.
11Based on SIP? data. Based on SCF data, 65 percent, 70 percent, and 77 percent, respec-
lively, of households in this age group had accounts.
12 Families with income less than $50,000 held 76 percent of the accounts and 66 percent of
the balances, according to SIP? data. The family data corresponds more closely to an IRS











FIGURE 3. Percent with IRA accounts, households, by income and
age, 1986.
holds with incomes less than $5O,OOO.Over one quarter of all house-
holds had accounts in 1986.14 And, a large fraction of families that did
not have accounts in1986would have had accounts before they retired.
Thus, it may be more accurate to say that IRAs are widespread among
potential savers.
II. IRA SAVING VERSUS OTHER SAVING: 1980 to 1989
If IRA saving substituted for other saving, one might have expected the
proportion of persons saving in other forms to decline as the proportion
saving through IRAs increased. Graphed in Figure 4 are the proportion
of households contributing to an IRA in each year and the proportion of
households with positive saving in non-IRA assets. (Figure 4a includes
stocks and bonds and Figure 4b excludes stocks and bonds.) The graphs
show that between1980and1989there was essentially no change in the
proportion of households with non-IRA financial asset saving. The pro-
13 Based on SCF data.
14 26.1 percent based on SIPP and 29.7 based on SCF.
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FIGURE 4a. IRA versus non-IRA savings, 1980-1989. including stocks
and bonds.
portion making IRA contributions grew from 3 percent to 20 percent and
then declined to 10 percent after the 1986 legislation.
Although we would expect the proportion of households with other
saving to declineif there were widespread substitution of IRA for
other savingit could be that even if IRA savers reduced other saving,
most would still have some saving in other forms. In this case, the
proportion with positive non-IRA saving would not change much. Thus
we turn to consideration of the change in saving balances.
III. CHANGE IN IRA VERSUS NON-IRA ASSET
BALANCES
In this section we consider whether the data appear consistent with the
possibility that IRA contributions represented no addition to total sav-
ing, but only a reshufffing of existing asset balances or a switching of
new saving from non-IRA to IRA accounts. The analysis is based on the
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FIGURE 4b. IRA versus non-IRA saving, 1980-1989, excluding stocks
and bonds.
In particular, we ask whether non-IRA balances declined, as the substitu-
tion (or reshuffling) hypothesis suggests. There are two ways that substi-
tution could occur: one is that existing pre-1982 assets were transferred
into IRAs in subsequent years. The other is that beginning in 1982 new
saving was in the form of IRAs instead of non-IRA financial assets; IRA
saving displaced non-IRA saving.
Three versions of the change in non-IRA balances are discussed. The
first is based on the balances of respondents to successive Consumer
Expenditure Surveys between 1980 and 1988. The second uses the same
data but adjusts for the change in the attributes of contributor respon-
dents to successive CES surveys. In both instances, the comparison is
based on the balances of the random samples interviewed in successive
surveys; the same respondents are not followed from year to year. The
third version compares the balances of the same respondents inter-
viewed through the Survey of Consumer Finances in 1983 and 1986. The
goal is to judge whether the increase in IRA balances was accompanied
by a transfer of assets from non-IRA accounts or by a reduction in new
saving in non-IRA assets.12Venti and Wise
A. IRA versus Non-IRA Asset Balances: CES Data, 1980 to 1988
Each quarter the Consumer Expenditure Survey obtains information on
a new random sample of households.15 Thus, each survey represents a
snapshot of households in that quarter. Data are obtained on income,
assets, and other household characteristics. The average age of the head
of the respondent households was about forty-six in each of our quar-
terly samples. We have combined data from the quarterly surveys to
obtain annual averages.16 These data are merged with IRA balances ob-
tained from the SIPP (1985 to 1987).
The median IRA balance of contributors was about $1,700 in 1982.17 By
1986 the median had increased to almost $8,000, and over one-quarter of
households had IRA accounts. What happened to other financial asset
balances over this time period?
Recall the two substitution possibilities: transfers and displacement
of new saving. If IRA balances were accumulated by making repeated
transfers from other accounts, the balances in other accounts should
have declined as the IRA balances increased. If IRA saving displaced
non-IRA saving after 1982, so that post-1982 respondents had begun to
save in IRA accounts instead of in other accounts, the typical 1986
respondent with an IRA account should have had less money in other
assets than the typical 1982 respondent. That is, even if no transfers
were made from existing 1982 balances, if new saving by households
after 1982 were in the form of IRAs instead of other assets, then the
accumulated balance in other assets should have been lower for house-
holds surveyed in 1986 than for households surveyed in 1982. This is
because the typical 1986 respondent would have accumulated less sav-
ing in other accounts in the previous four years than the typical 1982
respondent would have accumulated over the four years prior to 1982.
For example, suppose that in 1982 the typical forty-six-year-old had
been saving $2,000 per year in bank accounts for the past four years.
That person would have accumulated $8,000 in bank accounts by 1982
(ignoring interest accumulation). If after 1982 IRA saving completely
15 More precisely, a new panel is started each quarter and households in each panel are
surveyed five times (each quarter) over the following fifteen months. Only households
with heads 18 to 65 are included in this analysis and households with a self-employed
member are excluded.
16 All quarterly surveys conducted in a calendar year are included in the annual average for
that year. This means, for example, that the percent of households making IRA contribu-
tions in a year will not match the IRS figure for the percentage of tax returns showing an
IRA contribution for a tax year.
17 The median contribution in 1982, based on CES data.Policy and Retirement Saving13
replaced other saving, the typical forty-six-year-old in 1986 would have
saved $2,000 a year between 1983 and 1986 in an IRA but nothing in
other accounts. The person who was forty-six years old in 1986 would
have $8,000 in an IRA account but nothing in a regular bank account.
IRA balances simply would have replaced other balances. Total assets
of the 1986 forty-six-year-old would be the same as the total assets of
the 1982 forty-six-year-old.
The data are shown in Figure 5. The figure shows that there was no
systematic decline in the non-IRA balances of contributors as their IRA
balances increased. These data show the assets of the typical house-
hold in different years, not the change over time for the same house-
hold. Thus, if there were no change in saving behavior, no change in
returns on assets, and no change in household income, balances
would be expected to be approximately the same over this time period.
But nominal balances might be expected to rise as nominal income
grows.
Figure 5a shows that by 1986, the median IRA balance was about the
same as the median balance in other financial assets and was higher than
pre-1982 balances in other financial assets (excluding stocks and bonds).
The total financial assets of 1982 respondent contributors (including
IRAs but excluding stocks and bonds from other assets) was about
$9,427.18 A direct comparison with the total 1986 balance is not possible
because the CES data do not provide the IRA balance. Thus the totals are
not shown in the figures. But non-IRA asset balances based on SIPP data
are essentially the same as the CES balances and the totals,including
IRA balances, based on SIPP data should be close to the total assets of
CES respondents. Based on this assumption, the total assets of 1986
contributor respondents were 90 percent greater than the total assets of
1982 contributor respondents, $17,900 versus $9,427. The increase be-
tween 1980 and 1986 was 248 percent.
Similar trends are revealed in Figure 5b, which includes stocks and
bonds in non-IRA assets. The total financial assets of contributor respon-
dents, including stocks and bonds, increased by 71 percent ($21,650
versus $12,660) between 1982 and 1986 and by 214 percent between 1980
and 1986.19
In summary, non-IRA assets of respondents to successive CES sur-
veys did not decline as IRA assets increased between 1982and 1986.
18 Assuming that the 1982 household IRA balance was equal to the 1982 IRA contribution.
'The median asset balances appear to be unusually high in 1982 (see Figure 4a). On the
other hand, the new 1982 contributors may have had asset levels that differed from those
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For Respondents in Year:
C=Corttributors, NC=Noncontributors
FIGURE 5a. IRA versus non-IRA asset balances by IRA contributor,
excluding stocks and bonds.
Instead, non-IRA assets increased as well. Total assets of 1986respon-
dent contributors were much larger than the assets of respondents at
the outset of or prior to the IRA program. It is apparent that IRA
contributions were not funded by withdrawing funds from pre-1982
assets. Indeed, 1986 IRA balances were larger than pre-1982 non-IRA
assets. It also seems apparent from the data that the typical IRA con-
tributor was not accustomed to accumulating assets at an annual rate
equal to the typical IRA contribution. In addition, the data suggest that
the new IRA saving of contributors did not replace saving that other-
wise would have gone into non-IRA assets. Assets in both forms were
larger in 1986 than in 1982. Total assets were very much larger in 1986.
B. IRA versus Non-IRA Balances of Like Groups:
CES Data, 1980 to 1988
In the preceding section, the assets of the typical contributor respondent
in a year such as 1986 were compared to the assets of the typical contribu-
tor respondent in an earlier year such as 1982, at the outset of the IRA






















For Respondents In Year:
FIGURE 5b. IRA versus non-IRA asset balances by IRA contributor,
including stocks and bonds.
population in that year. But the characteristics of families who were mak-
ing IRA contributions may have changed over time. In particular, pre-
1982 contributors did not have employer-provided pension plans and the
non-IRA assets of these contributors may have differed from the assets of
the much larger group that began to contribute after the 1982 legislation.
To correct for this ambiguity, we consider the non-IRA assets of more
closely equivalent households. For example, instead of comparing the
assets of the typical 1986 respondent contributor to the assets of the
typical 1980 respondent contributor, we ask for the assets in 1980 of
households that were "like" the households who made IRA contribu-
tions in 1986. In 1980 most of the like households were not eligible for an
IRA. But by defining "like" groups, the 1980 and 1986 assets of "compara-
ble" households can be compared. The groups are comparable except
that the 1986 respondents had the opportunity to make IRA contribu-
tions for several years, while the 1980 respondents had not had the
opportunity.
To identify groups of "contributor-like" households, 1985-1986 con-
tributors are used to define the "contributor group." The 1985-1986 data

























































































































































































































































For Respondents In Year:
C=Contributors, All=All Households, NC=Noncontributors
1980 1986 CHANGE
For Respondents In Year:



















FIGURE 6.IRA versus non-IRA balances for like groups. c. excluding
stocks and bonds,1980-1986; d.including stocks and bonds,1 980-1986.18Venti and Wise
and age of head contributes to an IRA account. For example, about 68
percent of households with heads aged fifty-five to sixty-five and income
over $50,000 contributed to an IRA account; about 45 percent of those
aged forty-five to fifty-five with incomes between $30,000 and $50,000
contributed. Based on the 1985-1986 proportions, 68% of the 1980 house-
holds in the fifty-five to sixty-five age range with income over $50,000 are
randomly assigned to the "contributor-like" group, and so forth for
other groups. In practice the probabilities are calculated for sixteen age-
income categories. An adjustment is then made for the "individual sav-
ing effect" reflected in the higher non-IRA assets of persons within each
group who have JRAs20
Comparisons similar to those in the previous section can now be
made. They are shown in Figures 6a and 6b for the years 1980 through
1988 and in Figures 6c and 6d for 1980 and 1986 only. The conclusions
are much the same as those based on the unadjusted data, graphed in
Figures 5a and Sb.
It is easiest to consider first the comparison between 1980 and 1986,
shown in Figures 6c and 6d. These figures also show total assets of
contributors, including IRA and non-IRA amounts. The data are summa-
rized in Table 1. The 1980 IRA balance of contributor-like respondent
households was close to zero. By 1986 the median had increased to
$7,800. Contributor-like 1980 respondents had a median of $4,635 in
non-IRA financial assets, as shown in Figure 6c (excluding stocks and
bonds). The 1986 respondents had a median of $7,816 in non-IRA assets,
an increase of 69 percent.21 In addition to the increase in non-IRA assets,
the 1986 contributors had an additional $7,800 in IRA assets. Total finan-
cial assets of contributor-like respondents increased from about $4,635 in
20The adjustment is based on the difference between the non-IRA assets of an actual
contributor and the assets of a randomly predicted contributor in the same age and income
cell. It is the ratio of the median assets of observed contributors to the median of predicted
contributors within each of the 1985-1986 age-income cells. Non-IRA assets of the like
group in other years are obtained by first using the contributor probabilities described in
the text to identify the like group, then calculating actual non-IRA assets for this group,
and then applying the adjustment ratio. Separate calculations are made for the contributor
and noncontributor groups. Income is converted to 1986 dollars using the income growth
observed in the CESs.
21In years for which the assets of "contributor-like" respondents can be compared to the
assets of actual contributors the correspondence is typically close. For example, the median
non-IRA assets (excluding stocks and bonds) of actual 1983 respondents was $5,500; the
predicted assets of "contributor-like" respondents was $5,472. The implication we draw is
that the correspondence would also be close for 1980, for example, when the correspon-
dence cannot be seen because then there were few contributors. It also means that theTABLE 1.
CES-SIPP Summary.
and asset 1980 1986 % Change
Excluding stocks and bonds
Contributor-like:
Non-IRA assets 4635 7816 68.6
IRA assets 0 7800 -
Total assets 4635 17900 286.2
Noncontributor-like:
Total assets 508 752 48.0
Including stocks and bonds
Contributor-like:
Non-IRA assets 6238 12547 101.1
IRA assets 0 7800 -
Total assets 6238 21650 247.1
Noncontributor-like:
Total assets 523 781 49.3
Policy and Retirement Saving19
The 1986 IRA and total asset balances are from SlIP. Median 1986 non-IRA assets based on the CES and
the SIPP are virtually the same ($8,050 versus $8,040 excluding and $11,500 versus $12,200 including
stocks and bonds).
1980 to about $17,900 in 1986, an increase of 286 percent.Comparable
data are shown in Figure 6d, with stocks and bonds included in non-IRA
financial assets. In this case, the increase in total assets between 1980
and 1986 was 247 percent.
conclusions using 1986 as a base would have been essentially the same if 1983 had been
used as a base. For example, if 1983 was used as the base, the natural comparison would
have been to ask if 1986 "contributor-like" respondents saved less in non-IRA assets than
would have been predicted based on the distribution of assets of contributors by age and
income in 1983. The answer would be no; they saved about the same, plus they accumu-
lated a substantial balance in IRA accounts.
Again, based on the match between SIPP and CES median asset balances in 1986, as
discussed in the previous section.
Contributor status Respondents in20Venti and Wise
TABLE 2.
Time and Saving Deposit Rates in Commercial Banks.
Average over the preceding
Ending three four five six
in years years years years
Is it likely that without the IRA program the assets of like households
would have nearly tripled over this period? There are at least two rea-
Sons why non-IRA assets might have increased. One is that nominal
income increased and nominal saving might have increased as well. The
other is that changes in the rate of return on financial assets may have
changed. The increase in median income between 1980 and 1986 was 48
percent, much less than the increase in total financial assets: 286 percent
excluding and 247 percent including stocks and bonds. Indeed the in-
come increase was less than the increase in non-IRA assets: 69.6 percent
excluding stocks and bonds and 101.1 percent including stocks and
bonds. Assets may also have increased because of capital gains in the
stock market.23 But the financial assets of most savers are not in stocks.
Indeed, the increase in non-IRA assets excluding stocks and bonds was
not much greater than the increase when they are included, suggesting
that stock market capital gains is not the explanation.
It may be that non-IRA balances should be considered relative to the
overall increase in financial assets for all respondents. The trend in finan-
cial assets for the non-contributor-like group is also shown in the fig-
ures. The increase between 1980 and 1986 was 48 percent, much less
than the percent increase for contributors.
What about the return on commercial bank accounts, where the bulk
of most households' financial assets are held? Average time and saving
deposit rates in commercial banks in the years preceding 1980, 1982,
1983, and 1986 are shown in Table 2.24 The data for 1983 are included in
anticipation of the same issue that will be raised with respect to the data
in the next section.
The Standard and Poor stock market index more than doubled between 1982 and 1986:
The expected increase in financial asset balances would be much less than this because
only a small proportion of asset holders have significant equity in the stock market.
The rates are from the Savings Institutions Sourcebook, U.S. League of Savings Institutions.
1980 7.53 7.02 6.72 6.59
1982 10.28 9.58 8.87 8.31
1983 10.07 9.82 9.35 8.80
1986 7.84 7.99 8.48 8.95Policy and Retirement Saving21
The rate of return in the years preceding 1986 was somewhat higher
than the rate in the years preceding 1980, but the differences are not
large enough to explain the large increase in financial assets. Even the
increase in non-IRA financial assets seems large relative to the increase
that might have been expected based on 1980 non-IRA assets.
Based on these data, it seems to us very unlikely that IRA replaced
non-IRA saving; that there was no gain in net saving. Again, it is appar-
ent from the low 1980 asset balances of contributor-like households
($4,635) that before the advent of IRAs the typical contributor-like house-
hold had not been accumulating financial assets at an annual rate close
to an IRA contribution, typically $2,000 or $4,000 in 1986. (The mean was
$2,308.) It is also clear that the increase in IRA balances was not funded
by withdrawing funds from pre-1982 balances, which were substantially
smaller than the $7,800 put into IRA accounts.
Data for these two years, including stocks and bonds, are shown in
Figure 6d. The data for all years from 1980 to 1988 (Figures 6a and 6b)
reveal the same trends as the two-year comparison.
The adjusted CBS data discussed in this section provide an informal
picture very comparable to the results of the formal analysis in Venti and
Wise (1990a), which also was based on these same CES data. Indeed a
general test of the behavioral validity of the model used in that analysis
was to predict the saving behavior of households in the pre-IRA period,
using model estimates based on post-1982 data. In effect, with reference
to Figure 6, the model predicted quite accurately the low non-IRA saving
in 1980, based on estimates in later years when total saving (including
IRA and non-IRA saving) was much higher. That is, the model predicted
well what saving would be if the IRA limit was set to zero.
C. IRA versus Non-IRA Balances: SCF Data, 1983 to 1986
The discussion in the previous section is based on the comparison of the
asset balances of the different respondents to successive surveys, before
and after the general availability of IRAs. In that case, asset balances may
have increased during the time between the surveys because of income
growth, but age did not change systematically (the average age was
about forty-six in each year). An alternative to comparing different
household samples in different years is to compare the balances of the
same households over time. In this case, asset balances may increase as
the households age, and possibly as their incomes grow as well.
Such a comparison can be made using the 1983 and 1986 SCF data. We
begin with respondents to the 1986 survey. Only households aged
twenty-four to sixty-five are included in the analysis and households






















C=Contributors, AII=AIl households, NC=Noncontributors
FIGURE 7a. IRA versus non-IRA balances, SCF 1986 respondents, ex-
cluding stocks and bonds.
balances for this group in 1983 and 1986 and the change in balances
between these years by 1986 IRA contributor status are shown in Figure
7. Stocks and bonds are excluded from Figure 7a and included in Figure
7b. These figures also include total assets of contributors, including both
IRA and non-IRA balances, and show the change in assets between 1983
and 1986. The data are reproduced in Table 3. Again, the non-IRA assets
of contributors did not decline as IRA assets increased between 1983 and
1986; on the contrary, they increased substantially. The median 1983
non-IRA asset balance (excluding stocks and bonds) of households with
IRA accounts in 1986 was $6,360. Clearly, prior to 1983, this group had
not been accumulating assets at the rate of the typical IRA contribution.
And clearly the $6,000 increase in IRA balances (from $1,000 in 1983 to
$7,000 in 1986) was not funded by transferring funds from the 1983
balance ($6,360) in non-IRA accounts.
Without the IRA program, what increase in this 1983 non-IRA asset
balance would be expected over the next three years? In fact, the ob-25
Year
FIGURE 7b. IRA versus non-IRA balances, SCF 1986 respondents, in-
cluding stocks and bonds.
served 44.8 percent increase was equivalent to an annual growth rate of
over 13 percent. The increase in all assets combined, including IRAs,
was much greater than this. IRA assets also grew, by $6,000. The median
of total assets more than doubled, increasing by $11,100 from $8,900 to
$20,000.
Without IRA contributions, would the 1983 balance of $6,360 have
been expected to increase by almost threefold, to $20,000, by 1986? As
discussed in the previous section, the increase in total assets may be
determined in part by income growth and the increase in age, and the
data could be confounded by differences in economic trends prior to the
two dates, that is, differences in rates of return. The increase in non-IRA
assets between 1983 and 1986 is apparently not the result of the growth
in stock values over this period. The percentage increase in non-IRA
assets was about the same when stocks and bonds were excluded as
when they were included.
Assets may have been expected to increase with age and income. We
have controlled for these effects by predicting 1986 assets based on the






1983 1986 CHANGEdistribution of contributor assets by age and income in 1983. Adjusting
for the three-year age increase and the income increase between 1983
and 1986, the balance would have been expected to increase by about 25
percent, excluding stocks and bonds, and about 31 percent including
stocks and bonds. Including IRA contributions the actual increase was
almost 126 percent excluding stocks and bonds and almost 100 percent
including stocks and bonds. Commercial bank rates in the years preced-
ing 1986 were lower than the rates preceding 1983, as shown in the
previous section. The asset growth cannot be explained by unusually
high rates of return.
Thus, judging from the SCF data, it seems to us unlikely that the IRA
contributions simply substituted for saving that would have occurred
anyway. In particular, that inference seems implausible based onthe
information available in 1983. And again, based on the 1983 balance of
$6,360 the 1986 contributors prior to 1983 had not been accustomed to
saving nearly as much as they saved over the next three years. Compari-
son of the SCF with the CES summary tabulation in the previoussection







% Change 1983 1986
Excluding stocks and bonds
Contributors in 1986:
Non-IRA assets 6360 9209 44.8
IRA assets 1000 7000 600.0
Total assets 8900 20000 125.7
Non-Contributors:
Total assets 600 900 50.0
Including stocks and bonds
Contributors in 1986:
Non-IRA assets 9400 13500 43.6
IRA assets 1000 7000 600.0
Total assets 12075 24000 98.8
Non-Contributors
Total assets 729 1000 37.2Policy and Retirement Saving25
TABLE 4.





CHANGE IN OTHER SAVING WITH CHANGE IN
IRA STATUS
If non-IRA saving is reduced when IRA saving is increased, then when a
household that was not contributing begins to add to an IRA, that house-
hold should reduce non-IRA saving. Likewise, when a household that
was contributing stops, non-IRA saving should increase. The SIPP panel
data allow calculation of the change in non-IRA saving when IRA con-
tributor status changes. This simple calculation controls directly for
changes in saving behavior across families because it is based on changes
over time for the same families.25
Table 4 shows that there is a small reduction ($377.4) in non-IRA bank
account financial asset saving for new contributors and a small increase
($148.6) for households that stop contributing. But the changes are only
a small fraction of the typical IRA contribution, about $2,300.
Estimates incorporating all non-IRA financial assetsbank accounts,
bonds, and stocksare shown in Table 5. These data also reveal that the
change in non-IRA saving is much less than the typical IRA contribu-
tion. Although these data suggest some substitution, none of the esti-
mates is statistically significant. In particular, the hypothesis that there is
no change in non-IRA saving with change in IRA contributor status
cannot be rejected (as indicated by the F-statistics).
CHANGE IN SAVING BEHAVIOR
AND THE COINCIDENCE HYPOTHESIS
The data in the previous section suggest that the IRA program induced
substantial new saving. There is, however, one possible, although we




Contributor (317.0) (182.7)26Venti and Wise
TABLE 5.
Change in Non-IRA Saving when IRA Contributor Status Changes Bank
Accounts, Bonds, and Stocks.
believe improbable, alternative scenario that could explain the dramatic
increase in the financial assets of contributors: A sudden change in the
saving behavior of IRA contributors that just happened to coincide with
the introduction of IRAs. Change in behavior must be distinguished from
change in saving and from the confounding influence of person-specific
saving behavior. All of the data presented earlier rely on the change in
saving over timefor the same or for "like" householdsto infer
whether IRAs replaced non-IRA saving. The SIPP data in the previous
section show that non-IRA saving did not decrease much when house-
holds who were not previously contributing to an IRA began to make
contributions. Consideration of the change in non-IRA saving when IRA
contributor status changes controls explicitly for "individual-specific" sav-
ing behavior. Some households are "savers," they save more than the
typical household in all forms. Thus, the answer to the question, "Do IRA
contributors have less non-IRA saving than non-contributors?," is no,
they have more assets in both forms. This could be because IRAs do not
substitute for other saving. But it could also reflect the fact that IRA
contributors are savers and, in the absence of the IRA option, they would
save even more in other forms.26 This "individual-specific" saving effect is
dealt with by considering the change in non-IRA saving of a household
when the IRA saving of that same household changes. If non-IRA saving
of a household increased when IRA saving increased, for example, this
could not be attributed to the generally high saving propensity of IRA
26This affect may make it difficult to draw conclusions from the comparison of IRA contribu-
tors and noncontributors at a point in time. Thus some commentators have resolved that no
reliable inferences can be drawn from cross-section data, that is, pertaining to a sample of
households for a single year. But all of the studies by Venti and Wise, (1986, 1987, 1988,
1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b), for example, and the study by Gale and Scholz (1990), although
based on cross-section data (or a series of independent cross sections) consider changes in
asset balances to measure saving and use accumulated asset balancesgiven age and in-
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contributors. Using the SCF data, the issue is controlled for by consider-
ing the change in the non-IRA and IRA assets of the same households
between 1983 and 1986. With respect to the CES data, individual-specific
saving effects are controlled for by comparing random samples of
"contributor-like" households in 1980 with "contributor-like"households
in subsequent years. Thus the data are not confounded by comparing
savers with nonsavers; the comparison pertains only to savers. The re-
sults from each of the three data sources control for the higher propensity
of some households to save, in all forms.
But the results do not control for possible changes in saving behavior.
Nonsavers could suddenly become savers or low savers could suddenly
start to save more. This possibility cannot be addressed directly with
either the SIPP or the SCF data but can be addressed with the CES data.
With respect to the SIPP data, were the households that changed from
non-IRA to IRA contributor status on the verge of changing their saving
behavior, independent of the IRA program? Would they have increased
their saving even without the IRA option? Was it that they did not
reduce non-IRA saving when they contributed $2,300 to an IRA account
because they were going to increase total saving by $2,300 anyway and
the IRA was a convenient way to do it? This seems to us to be a possible
but improbable coincidental explanation of the increase in saving.
With respect to the SCF data: Were the 1986 IRA contributors the
households whose saving behaviorfor reasons not apparent in 1983
was about to change dramatically over the next three years, independent
of the new IRA option? Did the change in saving behavior just happen to
coincide with the advent of the IRA? On its face, this possibilityseems
an improbable explanation. The dramatic increase in asset balances can-
not be explained by a sudden increase in income. The median increase in
income for 1986 contributors was only 15.7 percent over the entirepe-
riod, from 1983 to 1986.
The same question may be posed with respect to the CES data. In this
case, more formal testing provides evidence against the hypothesis.
Were households with IRA accounts in 1986 those that in 1982were
about to change their saving behavior dramatically? And, did thisunex-
pected changebased on past saving behaviorjust happen to coincide
with the advent of the IRA program? Based on the CES data, IRA
"contributor-like" households had $4,635 in non-IRA assets in 1980. By
1986, such households had a median of $17,900, including IRA assets.
Were these households on the verge of an abrupt change in saving
behavior that was destined to lead to a three-fold increase in financial
assets over the next four or five years? As with the SIPP and the SCF
data, there is no evidence to support this possibility and sucha coinci-28Venti and Wise
dence seems to us to be an improbable explanation for the change in
financial asset balances.
But with respect to these data, the test reported in Venti and Wise
(1990a) provides a more formal rejection of the coincidence hypothesis.
Unlike the SCF data that pertain to the same households in 1983 and in
1986, the CES data pertain to random samples of similar households. For
example, the 1980 survey respondents were about the same age as the
1986 respondents. If the saving behavior of contributors changed just as
the IRA program was introduced, estimates of saving behavior based on
post-1982 data should predict pre-1982 saving behavior poorly. But the
formal model estimated on post-1982 data predicts well the pattern of
saving by income in the absence of the IRA program, prior to 1982. If
saving behavior had changed dramatically over this time period, one
would expect a poor match between actual and predicted pre-1982 saving.
Because large-scale substitution of IRA for non-IRA saving is not
found in the data, we have been drawn to consider a possible scenario in
which the data might not reveal substitution that in fact occurred. But it
is also possible that promotion of the IRA program spurred households
to save more in other forms as well, which is consistent with the large
increase in non-IRA saving as IRA assets began to accumulate. Or, the
consideration of retirement needs concomitant with opening and fund-
ing an IRA may have induced more saving in other forms as well. Both
the CES and the SCF data are consistent with the possibility that non-
IRAas well as IRAsaving increased after IRA contributions began.
This possibility is consistent with evidence on the relationship between
personal saving and firm pension plan saving, reviewed in Shefrin and
Thaler (1988).
VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE THEORY
Many expressed views on the saving effects of IRAs are not based on
empirical evidence but are speculations based on simple theoretical rea-
soning (see Gravelle 1989, 1991 for an extreme view). In some important
respects, however, the empirical evidence is inconsistent with the predic-
tions and the assumption embedded in the "theory-based" speculations.
Although these models may provide some insight into how people
should behave in a narrow financial sense, the predictions offer a poor
description of how the public actually responded to the IRA program.
Indeed, the assumptions are inconsistent with basic facts about IRA con-
tributors and IRA saving. Moreover, the assumptions underlying the
speculations virtually preclude any saving effect of IRAs. A more com-
plete model must recognize the broader economic and psychological chan-Policy and Retirement Saving29
nels through which an aggressively promoted tax-advantaged savings
plan may stimulate saving. Thus having presented the data,we empha-
size the limitations of judgments based on restrictive assumptions about
saving behavior that are embedded in the simple economic model. Inour
view it is important to determine from the data which assumptionsare
most consistent with the saving decisions of real people.
A. The Simple Model
The theoretical model underlying several recent judgments is what
Burman, Cordes, and Ozanne (1990) call the "traditional approach" and
what Gravelle (1989, 1991) calls the "conventional view." In this model,
there is only one form of saving. Thus the assumption is that households
treat IRA saving and other saving as perfectly fungible. Except for the
tax advantage, a dollar saved in an IRA is no different than a dollar saved
in another form. And, the "tax-price" difference is the onlymeans by
which the IRA program is permitted to affect individual behavior; IRAs
simply provide a higher return on the one and only form of saving.
From this characterization of saving behavior, it is a short stride to the
conclusion that IRAs will not stimulate saving. Burman, Cordes, and
Ozanne (1990:266) state the case: "If saving is motivated by life-cycle
consumption choices, two conditions must be satisfied if IRAsare to
stimulate private saving. IRAs must change the after-taxreturn to the
additional dollar saved for a significant number ofsavers and private
saving must respond to such changes. The task is then to determine
whether both of these conditions are likely to be met." Ofcourse, if one
assumes that WAs and other saving are perfect substitutes, that only the
marginal after-tax return matters, and that IRA saverswere saving above
the IRA limit, then there will be no change in the after-tax returnon the
next dollar saved and no change in saving. Furthermore, because the
general consensus is that saving is not very responsive to the after-tax
return, the boost to saving will be negligible even among those who
were not saving above the IRA limit prior to the IRA program. Thus,
following this simple model, the case against the saving effectiveness of
IRAs can be closed without looking at the data.
More generally, there are four assumptions embedded in the simple
theoretical framework that has been used by some to evaluate the saving
effects of IRAs: The first is that most IRA contributorswere already
saving more than the IRA limit prior to the advent of the IRAprogram.
(A related assumption is that the typical IRA saver had largeaccumu-
lated financial asset balances that could be transferred easily toan IRA
account.) The second is that the program inducement tosave operates
entirely through the after-tax rate of return. The IRA tax advantage30Venti and Wise
encourages saving by increasing the return on saving, upto the IRA
limit. But a household that is already saving more than the limit does not
benefit from the higher rate of return on an additional dollar saved. The
third, and most important assumption, is that IRA saving and other
forms of saving are treated by real people as perfect substitutes. The
fourth, and related to the third, is that the promotion of IRA saving had
no effect on their use.
B. The Evidence
We will consider these assumptions in turn, although it is not always
possible to neatly separate them. In particular, it is not always clear
whether an example should be thought of as contradicting the perfect
substitutes assumption or the assumption that only the rate of return
matters. Nonetheless, we have found it convenient to separate them in
the discussion. The simple model does not explain several prominent
features of IRA saving, let alone their saving effects, a much more compli-
cated issue.
Contributors Were Saving More than the IRA Limit.From the data
discussed previously, it seems apparent that the typical IRA contributor,
prior to the advent of the IRA program, had not been saving nearly as
much as the typical IRA contribution. Nor did the typical contributor
fund IRA contributions by drawing down pre-1982, non-IRA financial
asset balances. Both the CES and the SCF summary tabulationsand
Figures 6c and 7a, for example, show this clearly.
Only the After-Tax Rate of Return Matters. Much of IRA saving
behavior is inconsistent with saving decisions based solely on the rateof
return. First, if only the rate of return is considered,strictly financial
calculations show no difference between a "front-loaded" IRAwith an
up-front tax deduction but payment of tax on withdrawal from the IRA
accountand the "back-loaded" versionwith payment of taxes on the
contribution but no tax payment when the funds are withdrawn (if tax
rates do not change). But the evidence is that realpeople prefer the up-
front deduction. The here and now tax saving takes precedence over the
long-term equivalence calculation. The United Kingdom experience with
the Personal Equity Plan (PEP) provides evidence of the difference as
viewed by savers. The U.K. plan is patterned after the U.S. IRA, but
contributions are made on an after-tax basis, with no taxes paid when
funds are withdrawn. Unlike the U.S. experience, financial institutions
have found it difficult to attract contributions to the U.K. plan.
Second, the narrow rate of return analysis suggests that consumersPolicy and Retirement Saving31
can benefit by using tax-deductible borrowing (home equity loans in
particular) to finance IRA contributions (Kotlikoff, 1990). The empirical
evidence suggests, however, that this effect is either nonexistentor very
small (Manchester and Poterba, 1989; Skinner, 1991; Venti and Wise
1991b).
Third, after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, households thatwere no
longer eligible for the up-front tax deduction could still benefit from tax
free compounding of the return. The dramatic drop in IRA contributions
following the reform is inconsistent with saving decisions based strictly
on the rate of return. This drop can be explained neither by changes in
eligibility nor changes in marginal tax rates (Long, 1990). Instead, the
response suggests that the up-front deduction is important. It is appar-
ently what gets the attention of people.
3. People Treat IRA and Other Saving As Perfect Substitutes.To begin,
consider the implications of these three assumptions: (1) IRA contribu-
tors would save more than the IRA limit in the absence of the IRA
option, (2) only the after-tax rate of return matters, and (3) real people
treat IRA and other saving as perfect substitutes. Based on these assump-
tions, the introduction of IRAs may even reduce saving. The reasoning is
that if saving is subsidized, by reducing the consumption that must be
given up today to save for tomorrow, a saver can give up less today and
still have the same income to spend tomorrow. (A "target saver," for
example, could save less today and still reach target asset accumulation
at retirement.) Thus even less may be saved today. But this reasoning
breaks down if all forms of saving are not perfect substitutes in the
minds of the real people who make saving decisions.
Consider this example: I devote 2 percent of my earnings to a bank
saving account and 98 percent to other things. A new subsidized saving
vehicle is introducedthere is a sale on this type of savingand it is
heavily promoted as a means of assuring my financial well-being after
retirement. If the old and the new types of saving are perfect substitutes,
and the promotion has no effect on saving, new saving is likely to be
financed by reducing old bank account saving. But if savers view the two
types of vehicles as different accounts, like the mental accounts sug-
gested by Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Thaler (1990), for example,new
saving may be financed by reducing the 98 percent of income devoted to
other things rather than by reducing the 2 percent of income devoted to
bank account saving. The standard marginal arguments do not hold if
people think of the two forms of saving as different. This could be true
even without the promotion; it would be more pronounced to the extent
that the promotion is effective, as discussed later. Thus even people who32Venti and Wise
would otherwise save more than the IRA limit may increase their total
saving with the "sale on IRA saving."
There are obvious reasons why IRAs and other saving are not perfect
substitutes in theory. In particular, there is a penalty on withdrawal of
IRA assets before age 59.5. They are less liquid. Thus persons who want
to save for the short run may not want to use the IRA mechanism.27 But,
more important, what is the empirical evidence on substitutability?
Data for persons over 59.5 demonstrate the limitation of the perfect
substitutes assumption. Persons over age 59.5 are able to take IRA deduc-
tions but do not face any penalty for withdrawal of IRA funds. In terms
of availability and liquidity, IRAs for this age group are barely distin-
guishable from other forms of saving. The one difference is the higher
after-tax rate of return available through the IRA account, apparently
making the IRA unambiguously "better" than a conventional saving
account. Yet even most persons over 59.5 do not have IRA accounts. The
empirical fact is at odds with the implication of the perfect substitutabil-
ity assumption, suggesting that there is more to the IRA program than
the simple "tax-price" subsidy of a simple form of saving, the character-
ization at the heart of the simple model.
More general data for all age groups also reject the extreme perfect
substitutes view. If all forms of saving were perfect substitutes, all savers
would save first in the IRA form and only save in other forms if they
saved more than the IRA limit. But a large fraction of persons that do not
make IRA contributions save in other forms.
Another empirical regularity also suggests that the traditional model
mischaracterizes the IRA as a perfect substitute for other saving. IRA
contributions, unlike other saving, are bunched in the month preceding
the filing of tax returns. If the distinction between IRAs and other saving
is solely the tax advantage, then investors should open these accounts
some fifteen months earlier to take advantage of the higher return on
IRA accounts. That they do not behave this way suggests a behavioral
motivation other than or in addition to the rate of return.
4. The Promotion of IRAs Had No Effect on Their Use.Different modes
of saving may be treated by real people as distinct goods for several
reasons. Whatever these reasons may be, to the extent that the promo-
tion of IRAs is successful, the promotion may magnify the distinctions
among modes of saving and indeed may help to create them. The greater
27The studies by Joines and Manegold (1991) and Gale and Scholz (1990) relax the perfect
substitutability assumption by explicitly incorporating the withdrawal penalty in a three-
period theoretical model. Their theoretical predictions of the saving effects of IRAs are
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the promotional success, the more IRA saving may be distinguished by
savers from other forms of saving. In particular the widespread promo-
tion that accompanied the IRA program in the 1982 to 1986 period may
have served in part to distinguish IRA saving from other forms. The
simple theory leaves no role for the effect of advertising and other forms
of promotion on IRA saving.
Although it is difficult to assess quantitatively the psychological and
informational role played by the promotion, the direction of the effect
seems clear. The IRA fanfare psychologically earmarked IRAs for retire-
ment, possibly tending to limit the substitutability of IRAs for funds
saved in other "mental accounts." A goal of the promotion was to make
families more aware of the need to adequately save for retirement. Many
may have concluded that a special account for retirement saving was a
good way to foster behavior to which they would not otherwise have
adhered. The "sale" on this type of saving, of course, made the idea
especially appealing. Indeed the illiquidity of IRAs may be considered
an advantage by many; it may help to ensure behavior that would not
otherwise be followed. It may be a means of self-control. Thought of in
this way, IRA saving may have promoted greater saving in other forms
as well. The effect may be similar to the "recognition effect" advanced by
Cagan (1965) to explain the empirical finding that pension coverage was
associated with higher levels of saving (see also Katona, 1965). Thus the
promotion of saving accounts dedicated to particular uses may both limit
substitution between accounts and increase investor awareness of the
need to save for specific goals.
Several aspects of the public response to IRAs in the 1982 to 1986
period suggest to us that the fanfare accompanying IRAs was an impor-
tant ingredient of their success. First, the bunching of IRA contributions
during the media blitz preceding April 15 each year suggests that con-
tributors are responsive to promotion. As Summers (1986) noted, IRAs,
much like insurance, may be sold, not bought. Apparently the public
was an easy sell at tax time. For a typical taxpayer, the last minute choice
between writing a $800 check to the IRS or opening a $2,000 IRA may
have been too alluring to pass up.
A second indication of the role of promotion is provided by Feenberg
and Skinner (1989) who found that a large number of households were
"falsely constrained"; they contributed exactly $2,000 when they were
eligible to contribute more. Although transaction costs associated with
opening a spousal account provide one explanation for this behavior, it
is likely that the promotion, in which the amount $2,000 figured promi-
nently, played a key role.
Third, investor behavior following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 pro-34Venti and Wise
vides an indication of promotional effects. As emphasized earlier, IRA
contributions fell by much more than would be predicted given the
changes in eligibility rules. This "overreaction" is at least in part attribut-
able to widespread misunderstanding of the legislation (often reported
at the time to have eliminated IRAs) and to the marked decline in the
promotion of IRAs. Indeed, a recent survey revealed that about half of
all persons eligible for an IRA deduction following the1986legislation
mistakenly believed they were no longer eligible (IRA Reporter,1988).
The emphasis here on the promotion and the "psychology of saving"
that it may have engendered does not mean that the tax-advantage was
unimportant. Surely it was critical to the success of the program. It seems
apparent, however, that the promotion and fanfare played a critical role in
parlaying the tax break into IRA contributions. The simple economic mod-
els that do not recognize this are likely to be blinded to an important
explanation of the public response. Thus it seems to us that a complete
understanding of the effects of the IRA program must capture substan-
tially more than the limited reasoning embodied in the simple model.
C. What Makes IRAs Different?
If individuals behave as if all forms of saving are not perfect substitutes,
what fosters the behavioral distinctions? We believe that the advertising
plays a role. But any answer to this question is speculative. Although the
simple model is at odds with prominent features of IRA saving and, in
particular, the perfect substitutes assumption cannot be supported by
the data, the source of the distinction among different forms of saving is
not as clear. A possible explanation is provided by individual motives for
saving and possibly the "psychology of saving."
Personal motives for saving suggest compartmentalization. If IRAs are
held for different purposes than conventional accounts, then substitu-
tion possibilities may be limited from the perspective of many savers.
For instance, assets accumulated for short-term goals such as a down
payment on a home or a child's education may be unaffected by the
introduction of an IRA promoting saving for retirement. How much of
conventional saving is closely related to IRA saving? Stated reasons for
saving may provide a rough indication. Avery et al.(1986)tabulated
responses to the following question from the1983Survey of Consumer
Finances: "People have different reasons for saving. What are your (fami-
ly's) most important reasons for saving? Anything else?" Results are
summarized by age and income in Table6.At all income levels the
precautionary motive ("emergencies") dominates retirement as a motive
for saving. And only at ages above 55 does retirement dominate "emer-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ment. Although such evidence is only suggestive, it indicates that much
of non-IRA saving may be viewed as an imperfect substitute for IRA
saving, which is narrowly targeted for retirement.
Further evidence on motives for saving is provided by the asset hold-
ings of families on the eve of retirement. The data in Figure 1 suggest
that the typical family saves little for retirement in the form of financial
assets. For example, the median household financial asset balance in-
cluding stock and bonds was $6,600 in 1984 for households with head
age fifty-five to sixty-five. The family median is lessthan $3,700 (Venti
and Wise, 1991b). Thus it appears that, for most families, the level of
non-IRA financial asset saving destined to finance consumption in retire-
ment is low. For the typical family it is thus unlikely that a new IRA
contribution would substitute for funds that were previously targeted
for retirement.
Shefrmn and Thaler (1988) and Thaler (1990) have addressed these and
other empirical regularities that they find inconsistent with the tradi-
tional life-cycle theory of saving. They argue that some of the limitations
of the traditional theory can be overcome by modifications making the
model more behaviorally realistic. One of their suggestions is to recog-
nize that all forms of saving are not treated as fungible; individuals may
have a system of "mental accounts" in which they save for various
purposes. Some of these accounts may, by choice, be easily spent(e.g.
checking). As a means of precommitment or self-control other accounts
may be viewed as inaccessible. Shefrin andThaler place pensions in the
latter category. Apparently an IRA also would be viewed as inaccessible,
according to their view. For many individuals the ability to place some
saving "off-limits" may actually be a desirable attribute. To the extent
that "mental accounts" reflect individual saving behavior, they would
tend to limit substitution between funds saved for different uses.
D. Formal Analysis of the Perfect Substitutes Assumption
How individuals in fact behave is an empirical question that cannot be
answered by theory alone. Our approach in earlier formal analyses has
been to test statistically whether IRAs and other forms of saving are
treated as different, without trying to quantify the importance of, or
even identify, the possible reasons. We havedeveloped and estimated
an econometric specification that encompasses bothpossibilities, that is,
permitting flexible substitution. In particular, a special case of the specifi-
cation is the perfect substitutes possibility. This constraint is strongly
rejected by the data (Venti and Wise, 1986, 1987, 1990a, 1991b).
Even less extreme substitution implies that other saving should in-
crease once the IRA limit has been reached. Butthis pattern is not ob-Policy and Retirement Saving37
served in the data that we have analyzed, suggesting little substitution
(Venti and Wise, 1991b).
As emphasized earlier, the simple theory leaves no role for the effect
of advertising and other forms of promotion on IRA saving. Although it
is difficult to quantify the effect of advertising, we are convinced that
promotion played an important role in establishing the popularity of
IRAs. To the extent that promotion is successful, it would tend to show
up in our formal analysis as a preference for IRA saving over other forms
of saving and as a rejection of the perfect substitutes assumption, as the
data indicate.
To find that IRAs and other saving are not perfect substitutes is not
anomalous but instead is consistent with other empirical findings on
saving behavior. For example, one might expect that persons with firm
pension plans would have lower balances in personal financial assets
than persons without firm plans, controlling for personal attributes such
as age and income. It might be presumed that firm pension benefits
would substitute for personal saving. But the data do not show this. On
the contrary, there is a tendency for those with firm pensions to have
higher personal financial asset balances. The evidence is reviewed in
Shefrmn and Thaler (1988). What the data do seem to suggest, however,
is that firm pensions reduce earnings by inducing earlier departure from
the labor force. Instead of pension benefits substituting for personal
saving, they may instead, by inducing earlier retirement, substitute for
personal earnings, as emphasized in Lumsdaine and Wise (1990).
Closer to the IRA issue, it was presumed that IRAs would be more
likely to be opened by persons without private pension plans, control-
ling for personal attributes such as income, age, and other financial asset
balances. But the data do not show this tendency either; again, the IRA
does not appear to be a substitute for firm pension plans (Venti and
Wise, 1988).
We find that the simple model, which is the basis for much of the
skepticism about the saving effect of IRAs, provides a poor description
of actual IRA saving behavior. Simply economic theory provides an
incomplete guide to saving behavior in other instances as well. Thus it
should not be surprising if it were misleading in this instance. The
primary tool of the simple theory is the rate of return. But the empirical
evidence on balance shows little relationship between saving and ob-
served rates of return (e.g., Bovenberg, 1989). Other factors apparently
swamp whatever the effect of the return on new saving may be.28 Per-
28 It is even difficult to demonstrate a convincing relationship between rather wide-ranging
individual tax rates and contributions to tax-deferred saving accounts, controffing for in-38Venti and Wise
sonal saving rates vary dramatically among countries but standard
theory does not explain why. A plausible explanation is that habits,
cultural norms, "taste" for saving, and the psychology of saving vary
from country to country but are not incorporated in standard models.
Thus there is considerable motivation to look more broadly for explana-
tions of saving behavior. Relaxation of the restrictive assumptions of the
simple model is a start. But the data presented here suggest more, that a
realistic explanation of saving must recognize much broader economic
and psychological determinants of individual saving decisions.
DATA APPENDIX
Three sources of data were used to prepare tables and graphs in the text.
Each data source and the principal adjustments that were made prior to
calculation are described in this appendix.
1 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).The SIPP is a
large, ongoing survey of the U.S. population that is designed principally
to collect data on the income and participation in government transfer
programs. It is organized by annual panels, with each panel consisting
of eight or nine interview waves administered at four-month intervals.
Most of the SIPP data used here come from wave 7 of the 1984 panel
(administered September to December 1985), wave 7 of the 1985 panel
(January to April 1987), and wave 7 of the 1986 panel (January to April
1988). In the text tables and figures these three sources are referred to as
1985, 1986, and 1987 data respectively because they are closest to year-
end balances in those years. It is clear, however, that for each panel the
responses used may be as many as four months "off" from being year-
end figures, as many as four months early in 1985 and four months late
in 1986 and 1987. In all cases the IRA and other financial asset data
pertain to assets owned by the reference person and the spouse; assets
owned by other members of the household are excluded. Financial assets
excluding stocks and bonds include regular (passbook) saving accounts,.
money market deposit accounts, certificates of deposit or other saving
come, age, and other tax filer characteristics. Feenberg and Skinner (1989) conclude that
there is a positive relationship between marginal tax rates and IRA contributions, based on
U.S. tax returns. Long (1990) also concludes that the relationship is positive. But Wise
(1984) finds that the conclusion is extremely sensitive to the functional form used in the
statistical analysis. Indeed, using precise marginal tax rates calculated from tax returns, he
finds no relationship between individual marginal tax rates and contributions to Registered
Retirement Saving Programs in Canada, controffing for income and other tax filer attri-
butes, and using a specification that fits the data best. The evidence in Venti and Wise
(1988) suggests that the marginal tax rate may be associated with whether a household
contributes to an IRA but suggests little relationship to the amount of the contribution.Policy and Retirement Saving39
certificates, NOW or other interest bearing saving accounts, money mar-
ket funds, U.S. government securities, municipal or corporate bonds,
other interest earning assets, and noninterest bearing checking ac-
counts. The category financial assets including stocks and bonds also in-
cludes the market value of stocks and mutual funds (less debt or margin
account) and the face value of U.S. savings bonds. Note that the former
category, despite its title, contains some bonds. This arises because we
were unable to separate out bonds from other interest earning assets in
the SIPP and we wanted to keep the names of asset groupings consistent
with the categories derived from the other data sources.
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).The SCF is a panel survey first
administered between February and July 1983. A subsample of the origi-
nal sample was reinterviewed between June and September of 1986. The
1983 SCF is much smaller than the SIPP but contains more detail on finan-
cial assets. The 1986 reinterview contains less detail. In both 1983 and 1986
the special high-income sample is used. Details on the 1983 and 1986 SCF
are available in Avery and Kennickell (1988a, 1988b). Financial assets exclud-
ing stocks and bonds include checking, statement savings, passbook, share,
draft, and other saving accounts; money market accounts; and certificates
of deposit. The category financial assets including stocks and bonds also in-
cludes stocks and all holdings of bonds including U.S. saving bonds.
Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES).The CES is a quarterly panel
survey used to obtain information on household expenditure patterns.
Households enrolled in a quarter are followed for five quarters. We use
CES data for all quarters from 1980:1 through 1989:1. For the calculations
in this paper, we have combined all four quarterly reports into a single
annual average. Thus, for example, the CES asset figure for 1983 will
include balances reported for all 12 months in 1983. For this reason, and
possibly others as well, annual figures obtained from the CES may differ
from figures based on the other two sources, and from tax year data
reported by the IRS. Financial assets excluding stocks and bonds includes
saving accounts in banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and similar
accounts; checking accounts, brokerage accounts, and other similar ac-
counts; and U.S. savings bonds. The category financial assets including
stocks and bonds also includes securities such as stocks, mutual funds,
private bonds, government bonds, or treasury notes.
A key objective was to obtain from each data source a sample represen-
tative of the "IRA-eligible" U.S. population. The following steps are
common to each source of data:40Venti and Wise
Households in which the head or reference person is age sixty-five or
older are deleted. The minimum age is determined by the availability
of data for each source. In the CESs the minimum age of a household
head is eighteen, in the SIPP the minimum age is twenty-one, and in
the SCF the minimum age of a household head is twenty-five.
Households in which the respondent or spouse of the respondent is
self-employed are excluded. The self-employed had access to Keogh
plans with contribution limits very different from the IRA limits. Elimi-
nation of the self-employed also minimizes a potential complication
that arises because two of the surveys (the CESs and the 1986 SCF) ask
respondents for combined IRA and Keogh balances.
SIPP and SCF are weighted to represent the national population. The
CES is weighted to represent the national urban population.
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